■ Abstract For half a century, Ernst B. Haas was an extraordinarily prolific contributor to theoretical debates in international relations. His work focused on the question of continuity and transformation in the system of states. His substantive writings are extremely diverse and can be difficult, so no overall appreciation has ever been attempted. This essay pulls together the major strands of Haas' theoretical work into a coherent whole and seeks to make it accessible to the broadest possible audience of IR scholars. The first section locates Haas in the overall theoretical milieu in which his thinking evolved, and it identifies some core intellectual choices he made. The next three sections summarize Haas' main theoretical contributions to the fields of European integration, the study of change at the level of the world polity, and nationalism.
272
RUGGIE ET AL. popular and demanding course, Political Science 220: Theories of International Relations. Within a decade of entering the profession, Haas had accomplished the following:
written two widely reprinted critiques of the wooliness, internal incoherence, and contradictory policy implications of balance-of-power theory, to which only Waltz (1979) , more than a quarter century later, provided an adequate response;
helped invent the study of European integration and devised a novel theoretical framework, termed neofunctionalism, for understanding its dynamics and consequences; helped place the field of international organization on a more sound social scientific footing, rescuing it from legal prescriptions and institutional descriptions; and coauthored a moderately successful textbook.
Needless to say, he got tenure. Subsequently, Haas was deeply engaged in every major debate in the IR field well into the 1990s, including transnationalism, interdependence theory, regime theory, the role of ideas and knowledge in international policy making, and the ascendancy of neorealism and neoliberalism as well as the social constructivist rejoinder to them. He advanced our understanding of epistemological and ontological issues in IR theory. And he topped it all off with a two-volume study of nationalism, culminating more than half a century of teaching and research on that subject.
Yet, beyond the field of regional integration studies, Haas' work is not well known in the United States and is barely known at all elsewhere. This neglect of such immense contributions is a great pity. But it is also an interesting chapter in the sociology of knowledge in our discipline. Part of the problem is that Haas' work is difficult. His writing can be quite opaque; here, for example, is his preferred selection from the menu of systems theories that he surveyed as possible frameworks for analysis in Beyond the Nation State: "A dynamic system capable of linking Functionalism with integration studies is a concrete, actor-oriented abstraction on recurrent relationships that can explain its own transformation into a new set of relationships" (Haas 1964, p. 77) . He also had a habit of sharing with the reader his step-by-step assessment of every one of the voluminous literatures he drew upon in formulating his own thinking, even when they had led him to intellectual dead ends. But he was hardly alone in either of these practices.
The bigger part of the problem, we suspect, is that Haas swam against so many currents in the field while constructing his own intellectual terrain, including realism, idealism, the penchant for grand theory, neorealism and neoliberalism, most forms of rational choice theory, and positivism. As a result, he had relatively few natural allies in the discipline beyond the circle of his students and others who were drawn into personal contact with him. All within that circle were transformed by the experience of engaging with a truly learned, disciplined yet imaginative
INTELLECTUAL ORIENTATION
When Haas entered the discipline, the reigning approaches to international relations were realism and idealism, though idealism-for example, the movement to achieve world peace through world law, divorced from power-was being slain by realism. The brutal reality of World War II and the growing recognition that life hinged on a balance of nuclear terror saw to that. Haas, it goes without saying, was no idealist. As his students well remember, of all intellectual frailties, none earned greater disdain than being "a mush head"-and idealists topped this category for him. 2 Realists were another matter. They never thought much (if at all) about Haas' work, but Haas did think about theirs. As already noted, he wrote trenchant critiques of balance-of-power theory early in his career (Haas 1953b,c) . And he stated explicitly that his own theoretical work "takes for granted-even capitalizes on-certain Hobbesian aspects of international life" (Haas 1970, p. viii) . So what was the problem?
For one thing, Haas questioned the core assumption of realism. A democratic and pluralistic society, he wrote, simply "is not keyed to external dangers on a 1 Haas' lack of interest in coalition building within the discipline is best illustrated by a letter he wrote to Peter Katzenstein, in which he chastised him for going too easy, in a recent paper, on intellectual currents dissenting from the IR mainstream. In this letter, dated July 10, 1995, Haas wrote: "I don't share your tolerance for anyone who is disgusted-as we both are-with the primitivism of our rationalist colleagues, economists, IR people, and (in my case) the 'new institutionalists' in sociology. Just because we have a common enemy, do we have to be in bed with each other? In fact, the common enemy is also elusive because I have considerable tolerance for positivism (in nuances) even while detesting its manifestations in neorealism and neoliberalism in our profession. I guess what I am telling myself, in arguing with you, is not to trim my own work as counterpunching against the work of our friends and colleagues, but to tell our tales as plausibly as we can just to make the point that the same story can be told plausibly in a number of ways." 2 Although Haas strongly supported the promotion and protection of human rights, he remained cautious throughout his career about the best means by which to pursue these goals (see Haas 1986 Haas , 1993 .
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full-time basis and. . .is not organized so as to make one single conception of the national interest assert itself vigorously and consistently" (Haas 1953c, p. 398) . Therefore, assuming the existence of a singular national interest, as realists do, becomes a matter of analytical choice. But analytical choices are driven by research agendas-not by existential necessity, as many realists claimed. So Haas made his choice based on his research priorities. More serious for Haas was his perception that realists' analytical choices lead them to recapitulate endlessly why change in international politics is impossible, whereas the puzzle that interested him was how and why it happens. Indeed, he described neofunctionalism as a theoretical tool "to get us beyond the blind alley" and to "break away from the clichés" of realist analysis (Haas 1964, p. 24) . The stakes were high, Haas maintained, because the cost of the realists' choices is spent not only in theoretical coin. For example, none of the major realists of his day believed that the project of European unification could succeed, so if political leaders and policy makers had acted on the basis of those realist analyses, they would not have undertaken what turned out to be one of the most significant initiatives in the history of the modern system of states. Indeed, roads theoretically proscribed by realists are many, and others, too, have led to profound change in the actual practice of international politics. 3 Haas had that hunch early and pursued it for half a century.
But if neither realist nor idealist, who was Haas, intellectually speaking? This article aims to answer that question. The present section concerns the fundamental tenets of Haas' thinking that shaped all of his work, leaving it to later sections to address the specific theoretical orientations he brought to his major strands of research.
Haas' most enduring premises and approaches are essentially Weberian. We say "essentially" because some of these postures were adopted not directly from the grand master himself but through the writings of contemporary sociologists, including Reinhard Bendix, Philip Selznick, Peter Blau, and Daniel Bell, several of whom were Berkeley colleagues. Be that as it may, the following core elements of Haas' overall theoretical orientation may be described as Weberian. 4 First, as the following three sections demonstrate, the meta-trend or axial principle around which Haas' theoretical reflections revolved was the process of rationalization-that is to say, the gradual elimination of such traditional factors as status, passions and prejudices from the organization of public life and determinants of public policy, coupled with an ever expanding role of systematic calculation and evidence-based reflection (Weber 1947, ch. 1) . As seen in Weber's 3 Even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides an example. Leading realists, including George Kennan, who first defined and helped formulate the postwar strategy of containing the Soviet Union, opposed framing NATO around indivisible security guarantees (Article 5 of the treaty), which arguably turned out to be the very foundation of NATO's durability through and beyond the Cold War (see Ruggie 1995) . 4 The following discussion of Weber's approach to the social sciences and its implications for IR theorizing draws in part on Ruggie (1998) .
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analysis of the evolving bases of legitimate authority toward the legal and bureaucratic, this development had profound effects on the structure and functioning of institutions-including, Haas took for granted, international institutions and the modern system of states itself. Over time, Haas came to ascribe to human agency considerably greater control over the unfolding of rationalization than Weber had done, especially over the construction of shared meanings and consensus-based truth through social learning. Thus, in direct contrast to realism, a driver of change was at the very core of Haas' work-not linear, not immutable, but ever-present as a force to be reckoned with.
Second, Haas believed deeply in the possibility of a social science but, like Weber, only in one that expressed the distinctive attributes of social action and social order. For Weber, none was more foundational than the human capacity and will "to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it significance" (Weber 1949, p. 81, emphasis in original) . Ernst and Peter Haas put it more simply. In the natural sciences, they quipped, units of analysis "don't talk back" and they "lack free will; at least, none has been empirically demonstrated in atoms, molecules and cells" (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 583) . A viable social science, Haas believed, must accommodate-indeed, thrive on-the reflective and reflexive nature of human beings.
Third, despite being one of the most sophisticated theorists in the field, Haas protested throughout his career that none of his intellectual formulations constituted a theory as such. This was no mere quirk, fetish, or false humility. It followed directly from the Weberian understanding of the differences in concept formation and explanation between the natural and social sciences. Because human beings are reflective and reflexive, concepts in the social sciences must aid in uncovering the meaning of specific actions and in demonstrating their significance within a particular social context, or risk becoming mere reifications. In Weber's words, "We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations, and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise" (Weber 1949, p. 56 , emphasis in original). Haas described his objective in The Uniting of Europe in similar terms: "My aim is merely the dissection of the actual 'integration process' in order to derive propositions about its nature" (Haas 1958, p. xii, emphasis added) . If the purpose of social science is to demonstrate why things are historically so and not otherwise, then it follows that the appropriate cruising altitude is middle-range theory-a term Haas borrowed from Merton (1957) -grounded in actor-oriented processes, both intentional and unintended. Grand theory was a chimera, or worse.
Fourth, like Weber, Haas adhered to an ontology that included not only material but also ideational factors, and he paid particular attention to the interaction between the two. Here is how Haas (2004) Haas also drew from Weber his extensive use of typologies, explicitly conceived as ideal types, to illuminate possible modes of behavior, against which actual behavior could be assessed. An ideal type of political community is at the center of the analysis in The Uniting of Europe (Haas 1958, pp. 5-6) . In Beyond the Nation State he uses a method he terms "contextual analysis" and states that it belongs to the same family as Weberian ideal types, "more ambitious than historical narration and more modest than the effort at deductive 'science.' It seeks the general within the more confined context of a given historical, regional, or functional setting." The investigator selects and arranges the facts of actor conduct by using his own capacity "to identify himself with human motives that all of us accept as 'real' and relevant to the study of politics" (Haas 1964, pp. viii-ix) . In an influential article on "issue linkages and international regimes," Haas (1980) elaborates a fourfold ideal type of regimes, organized according to the capabilities that organizers of a regime might seek to create (p. 397). Haas never viewed ideal types as generating testable generalizations. That simply was not their purpose. "The best service to be expected from an ideal-typical discussion of regimes," he declared, "is to make people pause and think" (Haas 1980, p. 405) .
It follows that Haas had grave doubts about the entire positivist project in international relations-and political science as a whole. He was not data-shy and was willing to use quantitative indicators. Although his statistical skills were limited, he coded and updated thousands of labor standards issued by the International Labor Organization (ILO) since its origin in 1919 (Haas 1964 (Haas , 1970 ; he constructed and maintained a data base of United Nations peacekeeping missions (Haas 1972 (Haas , 1983 (Haas , 1986 ; and he coded indicators of the evolution of various forms of nationalism in five industrialized countries over two centuries (Haas 1997) . So quantification was not the issue; it was ontology and epistemology.
The covering law model of explanation, to which the mainstream of the discipline aspires, is ruled out by Haas' Weberian commitment. Causality remains concrete and is anchored in historically contingent meaning. The purpose of the various analytical tools that Weber used was not to subsume specific social actions or events under putative deductive laws, of which he believed few existed in the social world, but to establish links between them and concrete antecedents that most plausibly had causal relevance for real social actors within the social collectivity at hand. And so it was with Haas: "It is difficult to formulate universal claims over time and across cultures because of the mutable nature of institutions and the potential role of free will (that is, of actors' ability to change their minds and pursue new goals)" (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 584) . Or, as Ernst Haas wrote to Peter Katzenstein in 1995, "You cannot 'test' theories in such a way as to discard the worse for the better as our colleagues seek to do. Not even real scientists do it that way very often." 5 Let us be clear: Haas did not reject rigor; his own work was a very model of it. But he insisted on a rigor that was relevant to the object under study, and thus he contested the claim that a valid social science must pass positivism's natural-science-based truth tests.
Besides adhering to positivist fallacies, neorealism and neoliberalism premised their approach on the notion of exogenous and fixed interests-adding insult to injury, as far as Haas' entire research agenda was concerned. Haas considered these assumptions not only implausible but also of little use to him, as a scholar who had spent a lifetime studying the processes whereby actors come to define and redefine the ends they pursue in international politics, not just the means of pursuit. But, contrary to his admonition to Katzenstein in 1995 (see footnote 1), Haas did go relatively easy, at least in print, on neorealism and (even more so) neoliberalism, counting several of their leading practitioners among his closest professional friends.
One of Haas' last publications, coauthored with his son Peter Haas (who has contributed significantly to the study of social learning in the area of environmental policy and governance), describes the Haases' preferred methodological posture as "pragmatic constructivism" (Haas & Haas 2002) . 6 This approach emphasizes the role of human consciousness in the social reality that we study and relies on a consensus theory of truth to support interpretations and explanations. Its practitioners believe that progress in achieving a shared understanding of international institutions is possible, but only through "interparadigm mid-level discussions that try to resolve different interpretations of similar phenomena and conceptual applications that may lead, ultimately, to some degree of provisional closure and dispute resolution between paradigms" (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 595) .
Having established Haas' overall point of departure, let us turn now to the subfields of the discipline in which he made his most important theoretical contributions, beginning with the study of European unification.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
"Two events of great importance in the history of European integration happened in 1958," writes Dinan (2004). "One was the launch of the European Economic Community (EEC); the other was the publication of Ernst Haas' The Uniting of Europe" (p. ix). As far-fetched as it may seem to put the two on par, Dinan continues, they were in fact inextricably linked. Not only did Haas help to invent the academic field of integration studies, but practitioners also frequently invoked his work as they devised their strategies for advancing this historic project. Haas' students, when conducting interviews in Brussels, often heard responses to their questions framed in Haas' analytical categories. In 1997, Foreign Affairs selected The Uniting of Europe as one of the most important IR books of the twentieth century. 5 The same letter cited in footnote 1. 6 Adler (1991) had earlier described Haas' thinking in terms of "evolutionary epistemology."
Haas was among the first to realize that by liberalizing flows of trade, investment, and persons across previously well-protected borders, regional integration might transform the traditional interstate system that had characterized European politics for three centuries-the system whose failure had caused two world wars in a single generation. But he departed significantly from classical liberalism in his understanding of how this transformation could occur. He was the founder of neofunctionalism as an approach to the study of integration-insisting vigorously that it was not a "theory." This represented a novel synthesis of Mitrany's theory of functionalism and Monnet's pragmatic strategy for operating the European Coal and Steel Community and developing it into the EEC-both forerunners of the present European Union.
Mitrany (1943, 1966) believed that an expanding system of functionally specialized international organizations run by experts could become a transformative force in world politics. Haas reformulated this technocratic vision into a more political conception in which international cooperation was based on competing and colluding subnational interests that might be reconciled by the creative interventions of supranational technocratic actors. Jean Monnet, a leading French economic planner, was devoted to eliminating the risk of war in Europe, and that meant defusing the antagonism between France and Germany above all else. 7 After trying and failing to promote direct routes to this end-federalism and military unificationhe hit upon a second-best indirect solution: integrate the coal and steel sectors. These would be necessary to fuel any future conflict. And they had the additional "virtue" (given Monnet's objective) of being in decline, thus imposing economic as well as political adjustment costs on national political systems that international collaboration might help reduce. With the Marshall Plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (the OECD's precursor) behind him, and the U.S. government beside him, Monnet managed to cajole six countries into forming the European Coal and Steel Community, and also endowing its Secretary-General (a position he subsequently occupied) with modest supranational powers. What Haas did in The Uniting of Europe was to explore the dynamics, unanticipated consequences, and limits of this second-best strategy-nicely summarized in Monnet's phrase "petits pas, grand effets."
It has always been difficult to classify neofunctionalism in disciplinary terms because it intersects the usual assumptions of international relations and comparative politics. Neofunctionalism recognizes the importance of national states, especially in the foundation of regional organizations and at subsequent moments of formal refoundation by treaty. Yet it also emphasizes the roles of two sets of nonstate actors in providing the dynamic for further integration: (a) the interest associations and social movements that form at the regional level, and (b) the secretariat of the organization involved. Member states may set the terms of the initial agreement and strive to control subsequent events, but they do not exclusively determine the direction, extent, and pace of change. Rather, regional bureaucrats in league with actors whose interests and values are advanced by a regional solution to a concrete task at hand seek to exploit the inevitable "spillover" and unintended consequences that occur when states agree to some degree of supranational responsibility for accomplishing that task but then discover that success also requires addressing related activities.
According to this approach, regional integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process. But under conditions of democracy and pluralistic interest representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts of interest by conceding a wider scope, and devolving more authority, to the regional organizations they have created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more and more of their expectations to the region, and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic-social integration will spill over into political integration.
Neofunctionalism as articulated by Haas had no specific temporal component. How long it would take for these functional interdependencies to become manifest, for affected interests to organize themselves across national borders, and for officials in the regional secretariats to come up with projects that would expand their tasks and authority was left undetermined. Unfortunately for the academic reception of neofunctionalism, many scholars presumed that spillovers would occur "automatically" and "in close, linear sequence to each other" (Saeter 1993) . Even a cursory reading of Haas, however, especially of his more systematic presentation in Beyond the Nation State, demonstrates these to be fallacious inferences. But when the integration process in Europe proved to be more controversial and to make less continuous progress than expected, the theory was repeatedly declared "disconfirmed."
The irony of this tale is that Haas himself contributed substantially to the demise of interest in his own theory. By declaring in print on two separate occasions (Haas 1971 (Haas , 1975b ) that neofunctionalism had become "obsolescent," he made it virtually impossible for any other scholar to take the approach seriously. Who would dare to contradict its founder? Moreover, in the early 1970s, the process of European integration itself seemed stagnant, if not moribund. Lindberg & Scheingold (1970) concluded that although the (then) EEC had accomplished much, by the end of the 1960s it had settled into a sluggish equilibrium from which it was unlikely to escape for some time. Indeed, of the 10 contributors to a magnum opus of theorizing about regional integration (Lindberg & Scheingold 1971) , only one (Donald Puchala) was still writing on the subject 10 years later.
Why did Haas lose faith in neofunctionalism? The simple answer was Charles De Gaulle-a living embodiment of the realpolitik backlash against integration. Not only did De Gaulle put a sudden stop to the gradual expansion of tasks and authority by the Commission and to the prospective shift to majority voting in the Council, but he also made a full-scale effort to convert the EEC/EC into an instrument of French foreign policy. By the time it became clear that, however much De Gaulle and his successors desired these outcomes, they were not to happen, Haas was deeply engaged in research on transformation at the global level.
But, to borrow Adler's (2000) characterization, Haas turned out to be wrong about being wrong. When interest in European integration picked up smartly in the mid-1980s, with the unanticipated breakthrough of the signature and easy ratification of the Single European Act, interest in neofunctionalism also revived and blossomed in Europe-although not in the United States, where scholarly work on European integration as a whole has lagged seriously behind (one obvious exception being Moravcsik 1998). Indeed, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, American realists declared that the entire raison d'être of European integration had collapsed and that its nation-states would inexorably restore their previous interstate system (Mearsheimer 1990) . But thus far the opposite has happened. The calculation that German reunification made it more urgent than ever to bind Germany firmly to the rest of Western Europe undoubtedly played a major role in ensuring agreement on the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. But rather than confirming realism, this move demonstrates Haas' argument that even core realist imperatives can be resolved through broader integrative measures, once the process of integration has reached a certain level. Maastricht committed its signatories to establishing a common currency, the Euro, an idea that had been proposed on several occasions but always rejected as intruding too far, materially and symbolically, into the sovereignty of member states. To the surprise of almost everyone, the introduction of the new common currency produced relatively little resistance, and this "mother of all spillovers," as it became known, has been a quiet yet historic success.
Haas was quite skeptical about broadening the analysis of integration to other regions. In 1961 he concluded that integration is a "discontinuous process," and he declared that "if regional integration continues to go forward in these areas [outside of Europe], it will obey impulses peculiar to them and thus fail to demonstrate any universal 'law of integration' deduced from the European example" (Haas 1961) .
So what is Ernst Haas' European legacy? His work on regional integration continues to be read and cited-with increasing frequency since the 1990s. At the same time, by now almost everyone recognizes that no single theory or approach can explain everything one would like to know or predict about the EU. The process has already generated the world's most complex polity, and despite the Convention's "Constitutional Treaty," there is every indication that it will become even more complex now that it has 10 new members and has been taking on new tasks. 8 8 A very important limitation of neofunctionalism should be noted. It focuses exclusively on the extension of the integrative process to new tasks and on the expansion of common authority. It says nothing about the incorporation of new members, which has been a major dynamic feature of the EU. How, when, why, and under what conditions a regional organization will expand territorially is simply not contemplated by the neofunctionalist approach.
Moreover, the entire logic of spillover based on underlying and unanticipated functional interdependencies may have exhausted itself. On the one hand, the EU is already involved in some fashion in almost all policy domains. On the other hand, if monetary union is any indication of the future, the designers of the European Central Bank were very careful to insulate it from any relation with the Commission or with organized interests. The same seems likely to occur in the cases of police cooperation and foreign policy coordination. Only a common energy policy and certain aspects of transport infrastructure seem capable of igniting latent functional linkages and generating the unintended consequences on which neofunctionalism thrived. Moreover, the expansion to 25 members of much greater heterogeneity of interests and values means that it will become much more difficult to respond with an expansive package deal that will have something in it for everyone. Given such diversity, it is much less likely that actors will recognize a common need, that experts will agree on what to do, that lessons will be transferred from one experience to another, and that citizens will mobilize in order to demand that the good, service, or regulation they desire be supplied by the EU rather than their national state or subnational region.
But the real impediment to a revived neofunctionalist dynamic comes from something Haas long ago anticipated yet which was slow in coming to the European integration process: its growing politicization (Schmitter 1971) . When citizens begin to pay attention to how the EU affects their daily lives, when political parties and large social movements begin to include "Europe" in their platforms, and when politicians begin to realize that they can win or lose votes by addressing policy issues at the regional level, then the entire neofunctionalist strategy becomes much less viable. Discreet regional officials and invisible interest representatives in league with national civil servants can no longer monopolize the decision-making process in Brussels (known in Euro-speak as "comitology"). Integration starts to generate winners and losers within member states, and its aura of being an allwinners game fades. Haas (1976) had an idiosyncratic term for this: he called it "turbulence." There is no question that the process of integration in Europe has become turbulent and that neofunctionalism, therefore, no longer captures many of its main drivers.
Yet in his last published work, an introduction to a reissue of The Uniting of Europe, Haas (2004) began to sort through the many bodies of institutionalist theory that now seek to explain European integration. His aim was to identify how neofunctionalism itself needed to be updated and modified. Nothing conveys Haas' enduring commitment to scholarship more clearly than this effort, completed only weeks before his death.
INTERNATIONAL CHANGE
When Haas (temporarily, as it turned out) abandoned European integration studies in the 1970s, he turned his attention full-time to exploring processes of change at the level of the world polity. Beyond the Nation State, published in 1964, had set the stage but also altered it permanently. It was Haas' only sustained study of integration at the global level. However, he found that the record of more than 40 years of ILO conventions on labor standards, which he coded carefully, yielded few of the predicted consequences. As a result, he expanded his analytical focus considerably beyond integration to examine different patterns of international cooperation and their potential long-term effects on the structure and conduct of international politics.
At this point, we encounter a problem. Whereas Haas' contributions to the study of European integration comprise a coherent whole and are readily assessed against actual developments, it is far more difficult even to summarize, let alone evaluate, his work on global cooperation and its transformative potential. One impediment is that the subject matter itself is so vast, and Haas' voluminous writings left virtually no aspect of it untouched. At the same time, though, he produced no single, definitive piece of work in this area, but rather a series of plausibility probessome in hefty book form, to be sure-that comprise successive approximations of the reality he was trying to grasp and elucidate.
Nevertheless, a good place to begin is with the realization that, although Haas viewed the European integration experience as unique, it was for him but a special or extreme case of a more general phenomenon. "The study of integration is a step toward a theory of international change at the macrolevel" (Haas 2004, p. xv) . So the puzzles that animated his curiosity and drove his research in the two areas were in some ways similar, but the processes and forms of cooperation at the global level would differ because the world polity differed from the European regional system. Therefore, his analytical apparatus would have to be modified accordingly and parts jettisoned entirely. Haas' work in this area is a moving target because it represents an ongoing, systematic effort at reflection and reformulation. His quest reached closure of any sort only in 2002, when Haas endorsed what he called "pragmatic constructivism" as the theoretical orientation best equipped to capture international change at the macro level, and acknowledged that he had been speaking its prose all along (Haas & Haas 2002) . In his introduction to the reissued Uniting of Europe (Haas 2004) , he reached the same conclusion with regard to the study of European integration. At least in overall approach, then-including their ontology and epistemology-his "special theory" and "general theory" (to use the terms metaphorically) had become unified.
Thus, rather than engaging individual pieces of Haas' work that often were superseded in their specifics by subsequent writings, we take a twofold tack. First, we identify and discuss briefly the distinctive and enduring questions that drove Haas' inquiries into the processes of change in the world polity, wherever possible using his own words. Then we offer our own synthesis of his endeavor in this domain, which we believe to be consistent with his thinking. 9
Strategic Questions
What were the core questions that drove Haas' studies of international change? Without claiming to be exhaustive, we have selected five questions that seem central to his evolving research program.
HOW DOES VOLUNTARY COOPERATION OCCUR?
The first and most general question Haas addressed was: How does voluntary cooperation, not involving the use of force, take place in international politics (Haas 1970, p. 608 
)?
He did not take the easy way out by assuming altruism or commitment to principle on the part of the major actors. On the contrary, he insisted consistently that states act "on their perceived interests" (Haas 1990, p. 6) . "Major interest groups as well as politicians determine their support of, or opposition to, new central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of advantage" (Haas 1958, p. xiv) . Indeed, he held that even "learning is based on the perception of self-interest displayed by the actors" (Haas 1964, p. 48) .
Moreover, he rejected the idea that formal structures or treaty texts were a good guide to what international organizations end up doing or making possible. Even in The Uniting of Europe, he argued that cooperation depends more on people's perceptions and attitudes than on formal structures. Contrary to some advocates of supranationalism, for example, Haas did not assume that "an intergovernmental structure automatically guarantees the prevalence of diplomatic decision-making techniques and thereby controls [in the sense of limiting] integration." Instead, he believed (Haas 1964, p. 487 
):
It is impossible to assess the role of the Council in European integration merely. . .on the basis of treaty texts. If the operational code habitually employed by the people who compose the Council can be demonstrated to result in further integration, then plainly the general level of argumentation described [in treaty texts] is beside the point. The corollary would be that institutions of a federal type do not necessarily guarantee integration, while organs of a diplomatic character may actually aid it, depending on the techniques of decision-making used.
Haas' approach to resolving the puzzle of cooperation was sociological, behavioral, and cognitive. Broadly speaking, cooperation occurs in situations where domestic welfare concerns dominate considerations of national power, and where groups exist that can articulate those welfare concerns within national decisionmaking structures. Thus, capitalist social democracies and pluralism are fertile grounds for cooperation, but functional equivalents can exist in other political systems. Beyond that background condition, cooperation requires some convergence of actors' interests, which can be helped along by international institutional actors with appropriate problem-solving orientations. Success in meeting initial interests on one round may produce incremental shifts in expectations among the actors, and begin to create habits of practice that reinforce cooperation. By employing creative bargaining styles, key elites can upgrade conceptions of individual interests into some acceptable formulation of a common interest, thereby leading at least to a partial redefinition of the separate self-interests (Haas 1958, pp. xv, xvi; 1964, p. 111) . A second question followed closely on the first.
WHAT KINDS OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOSTER COOPERATION?
Under what conditions is cooperation fostered by institutional arrangements focused on specific tasks that do not directly involve the interstate politics of peace and security?
All of Haas' work was based on the premise that "international organizations are designed by their founders to 'solve problems' that require collaborative action" (1990: 2)-and not for their own sake. But not all such efforts were equally successful. The ability to solve problems, he believed, was related to the "functional specificity" of tasks the organization was assigned, or their "separability" from core issues related to national power and status (Haas 1964, pp. 47-52) .
Again, European integration represented one end of the spectrum. There, certain kinds of organizational tasks most intimately related to functionally specific group and national aspirations-beginning with rationalizing the coal and steel sectorsresulted in integration, even though the actors responsible for this development may not have deliberately worked toward it (Haas 1964, p. 35) . In contrast, when Haas (1983) examined the evolution of UN peacekeeping, he saw "regime decay" occurring over time. In a superficial sense, the neofunctionalist expectation is borne out: Functionally specific tasks promote intense cooperation, whereas matters more centrally related to national security exhibit the limits imposed on it. However, most areas of international cooperation examined by Haas fell in between those two extremes and remained "encapsulated," showing few if any signs of contributing to learning or to an overall expansion of cooperation. This puzzle led to still another question.
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF ACTOR COGNITION?
In successful instances of international cooperation, when and how do actors' key cognitions change to reinforce cooperation? Haas kept asking this question-almost alone among students of world politics-for 40 years. But the types of cognition he focused on changed over time.
He began by considering possible shifts in loyalty, which was central to the process of political integration as explored in The Uniting of Europe and subsequent articles. Shifts in loyalty did not travel beyond the European context, however, and produced complex results even there. Haas also was critically attuned to changing actor expectations about who can best deliver the goods, a concern that foreshadowed the emphasis on expectations both in the literature on regimes and more generally in contemporary game theory (Haas 1961, 367) . In Beyond the Nation State, he examined different bargaining styles that promote or limit cooperation, as well as actor learning, particularly whether lessons learned in one functional context are transferred to others (Haas 1964, p. 48) .
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In his long and complex essay, "Is there a Hole in the Whole" (1975a), Haas first addressed in some depth the issue that would become the hallmark of his subsequent intellectual agenda: the role of consensual knowledge in organizational learning that results in expanding the domain of cooperative action. By 1990 he considered such knowledge, or self-consciousness, to involve questioning "basic beliefs underlying the selection of ends," and not merely of means (Haas 1990, p. 36) . In this line of research, he sought to elaborate "a notion of organizational decision making in which knowledge, consensual or not, deflects raw interest. I am not here interested," he declared, "in goals based on interests uninformed by knowledge" (Haas 1990, p. 75) , because such conventional cases would entail none of the potential for international change that he sought to discern.
In his contribution to the famous International Organization special issue on international regimes, Haas (1982) emphasized the differences between the mechanical metaphors of mercantilism and liberalism, on the one hand, and the organic metaphors of ecologically minded analysts, on the other, and suggested that the latter held far greater potential to expand cooperation. In When Knowledge is Power (Haas 1990 ), self-reflective learning took center stage: learning based on consensual causal knowledge-in other words, on physical and social scienceand its ability to inform the definition of the means and ends of policy.
IS ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING PROMOTED BY SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND BY THE INVOLVEMENT OF EXPERTS?
In key articles of the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in When Knowledge is Power, Haas answered, "It can be." He differentiated learning, which involves changes in causal beliefs, from mere adaptation, which does not. Adopting a concept introduced by Ruggie (1975) in a special issue of International Organization they coedited, Haas articulated the idea of "epistemic communities" of professionals "who shared a commitment to a common causal model and a common set of political values" (Haas 1990, p. 41 )-the epistemic community comprised of practitioners of Keynesian economics, for example, or of various branches of ecology. He expressed the belief that "the language of science is becoming a world view that penetrates politics everywhere" (p. 46), and therefore would affect the way in which states' interests are defined.
This proposition seemed truer in some areas than others. "The more dependent an issue area becomes on technical information, the greater the likelihood that epistemic communities gain in influence" (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 592) . At the same time, there must be a growing demand for such knowledge on the part of policy makers: "Consensual knowledge that is not acknowledged by government remains irrelevant, though the demand can sometimes be stimulated by enterprising knowledge brokers"-international institutional actors being key among them.
Haas' emphasis on epistemic communities and socially influenced learning made him identify, during his last decade, with constructivism as an approach to understanding international relations. "Pragmatic constructivism" was the label he and Peter Haas applied to their favored approach to social science, in particular the study of international institutions. (Haas 2004, p. xiv) . He saw his own work as providing a tentative "yes" for an answer. Neofunctionalism, he wrote in 2004, "was developed explicitly to challenge the two theories of IR dominant in the 1950s, classical realism and idealism" (Haas 2004, p. xiv) .
Haas sometimes seemed reticent about addressing normative issues explicitly; indeed, on occasion he wrote as if he studied international cooperation merely out of intellectual curiosity. This comes as little surprise when we recall that, when Haas started his long scholarly career, the mere accusation of being an "idealist" could marginalize a scholar within the discipline. And so, in the original Uniting of Europe, he disclaimed interest in evaluating whether a United Europe would be good or bad and said he saw it as akin to a laboratory experiment in voluntary cooperation (Haas 1958, p. xi) . In Beyond the Nation State he wrote that "even chaos becomes bearable when its constituents and their movements are understood" (Haas 1964, p. 497) . And in When Knowledge is Power he declared, "states, not scholars writing books, are the architects that will design the international organizations of the future" (Haas 1990, p. 6) .
But he let the cat out of the bag in 1970 when he admitted that "the main reason for studying regional integration is normative"-the opportunity to "study the peaceful creation of possible new types of human community" (Haas 1970, p. 608) . One of his most explicit normative statements came in "Is there a Hole in the Whole?" (Haas 1975a) , where he grappled with the role of science in politics. Haas was deeply committed to the proposition that scientific knowledge could contribute to a social learning, which in turn could generate better-informed conceptions of the public interest. Yet he was resolutely opposed to deterministic or totalizing notions of science, in which scientific knowledge would provide moral purposes as well as the means of their realization. For Haas, human purposes had to remain primary, and they had to be determined through political participation. In using knowledge, "all groups making a claim to having studied the issue must be included" (Haas 1975a, p. 850) , and conceptions of knowledge must remain open-ended, subject to debate and change. In that article, he declared his commitment to "informed incrementalism as a way to approach the construction of wholes, as resulting from a better understanding of the parts and their linkages" (p. 851).
In his later work, Haas became interested in deliberate learning strategies, through consensual knowledge and epistemic communities. He cited as one example the UN Global Compact's efforts to develop and apply consensual knowledge about best corporate practices in promoting human rights, labor standards, and environmental sustainability at the global level (Haas & Haas 2002, p. 597) . Consensual knowledge and the raising of consciousness had the potential, he thought, for helping to transform political life. Throughout his career, Haas used his methodology of ideal types to imagine transformative possibilities, rather than simply to analyze world politics as it is. But he never permitted his normative interests or 287 commitments to get in the way of the evidence, frequently reaching conclusionsas with the entire integration project in the 1970s-that were uncongenial to his own preferences.
The last chapter of When Knowledge is Power is a profession of Haas' personal commitment to progress, defined in terms of more holistic, but still humancentered, ways to manage interdependence better. His normative view is expressed on the last page: "One can think about human progress as an open-ended groping for self-improvement, without a final goal, without a transcendent faith, but with frequent reverses and sporadic self-questioning about the trajectory of change" (Haas 1990, p. 212) .
A Synthesis
If we combine these core animating questions and Haas' evolving answers into a coherent whole, what is the resulting model-or ideal type, to be precise-of international change at the macro level?
It is important to stress again that he assumed "certain Hobbesian aspects of international life" (Haas 1970, p. viii) . But he also assumed domestic pluralism and interest group competition, or some functional equivalents. And he stipulated that international actors-typically leaders of international institutions-served as norm entrepreneurs as well as potential allies of domestic groups who saw that their interests could be, or even must be, pursued beyond the confines of their own national state. So to the "certain Hobbesian aspects" Haas added both push and pull factors inclined toward some measure of internationalizing policy processes.
Next, Haas expected that certain kinds of issues would bias the process in favor of actors who perceived internationalization to be in their interest, because it helped them meet their objectives. Over the years, as we have seen, he explored a number of such "strategic items," as he once called them (Haas 1964, p. 83) , which might have this "expansive" potential: (a) the emergence of domestic economic and social welfare as the universal measures of political legitimacy, so that national decision makers faced higher costs if they opposed internationalization of policy processes when it advanced those goals; (b) the emerging concept of human rights, which by definition claims universality and addresses the most intimate of relations between citizens and their state; (c) the human environment, which embodies intrinsic natural connectivities that respect no political boundaries; and more generally, (d) what we might call the growing demand-capacity gap that results from the increased complexity and mobilization of modern society, coupled with the proliferation and escalation of diverse objectives that policy makers consequently must consider-which Haas (1976) described as "turbulent fields."
Haas' research suggested that greater international cooperation, at least on early iterations, did not necessarily trigger transformation. There was just more of it: in the forms of international regimes, institutions, and norms. And so, as a secondorder question, he explored how the growing role of scientific knowledge and scientists in policy making changed the picture. Why would it? Because, he presumed, natural scientists would be more likely than politicians or bureaucrats to push consensual knowledge about, say, environmental degradation, and social scientists would add both a reflective and a reflexive element to the policy-making mix. 10 Along the way, Haas also gradually modified what he meant by international change. His first inclination was to extend into the global arena his original template for regional integration: "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas 1958, p. 16; 1961) . He quickly abandoned this model of supranationality even for the case of Europe and realized that it had no relevance globally. In Beyond the Nation State, the definition of international transformation was modified to "the process of increasing the interaction and the mingling [between states and international organizations] so as to obscure the boundaries [between them]" (Haas 1964, p. 29) . But it was still expected to involve a shift from unit to system. By the time he got to "Is there a Hole in the Whole?" (Haas 1975a) , that notion, too, was abandoned, and transformation itself was transformed. In that essay, "transformation" refers to state actors learning to manage problems collectively that exceed the grasp of any one, by constantly aggregating and reaggregating issue bundles into temporary wholes that they agree to govern collectively. In this account, successive rounds of that process, over the long term, come to approximate more closely the consensual knowledge about underlying cause/effect relations in the issue areas in question, as well as the substantive values at stake in them-be they human rights, environmental sustainability, or a measure of distributive justice via development assistance. Judging from the 2002 article Ernst Haas coauthored with Peter Haas, he seems to have concluded that the empirical processes of international cooperation that he had studied for so long at least modestly conformed to and explained this outcome.
But by the 1990s Haas also seems to have concluded that, in terms of fundamental international transformation, at least outside the EU, the transformative potential of action at the international level would continue to be both modest and incremental, as his most recent work had recorded. And so he turned his attention back to the source where, in a certain sense, the challenge had begun: back to the phenomenon of nationalism.
ON NATIONALISM
As a Jew, Haas was forced to leave Germany with his parents in 1938, at the age of 14, having experienced first-hand a virulent and intolerant nationalism that detested difference in the German Volk. In the United States, in contrast, he found 10 Thus, it was a moment of professional pride for Haas when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001 for "bringing new life to the organization," in the words of the Nobel citation. Although he and Annan never met, for Haas it was enough that Ruggie was Annan's chief advisor for strategic planning, and that, as a former Haas student, Ruggie was attempting to practice what Haas had long preached.
The story of liberal nationalism starts in the eighteenth century, with the rise of the idea of progress and the very possibility for a public policy that incorporates scientific reasoning and evidence. Liberal nationalism could be defeated temporarily by other types of nationalism-for example, the integral nationalism that Haas experienced as a boy in Nazi Germany. Whereas liberal, progressive nationalism is affirming and open to change, Nazi-style integral nationalism lacks self-examination and acts out only one political repertoire of action. More than half of the songs in the Horst Wessel songbook, for example, sung by millions of young Germans in the 1930s, reportedly dealt with death. It was a nationalism that celebrated the prospect of marching itself and tens of millions into the grave. Among all the different kinds of nationalism, over the long term, liberal nationalism alone holds forth the promise of bringing about reciprocal exchanges in society, of sustaining formal rationality and self-examination based on adaptation or learning.
For each of the five societies, Haas collected systematic data on 16 indicators, such as official language, conscription rules, popular acceptance of state taxation, and the like. The consensual degree of acceptance of each indicator was ranked in ordinal terms and the scores were summed for each of seven years over the course of two centuries. Across the seven data points, the acceptance scores increase for all five societies, indicating that over time substantial social learning occurred. But they also reflect movement at different speeds and temporary reversals. The AngloSaxon countries evolved differently from France and Germany, for example, not only until World War II but also between 1950 and 1990. France and Germany appear to have attained in the recent past a higher degree of internal reciprocity and procedural liberalism, as well as a greater awareness of the inevitability of nesting their liberal nationalism in Europe-wide political arrangements, than Britain has. The United States, like Britain, shows signs of growing social divisions in recent decades, and a growing resistance to governance beyond the nation-state. In the long run, however, liberal nationalism clearly is progressive. Indeed, Haas anticipated that it eventually will transform itself, at least in part, into new forms of multilateral cosmopolitanism.
The analysis of eight latecomers to nationalism is the subject of the second volume, subtitled The Dismal Fate of New Nations (Haas 2000) . The analysis includes China, India, Iran, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and the Ukraine. Nationbuilding leaders in the Third World and transition states use nationalism as a rationalizing and progressive formula. Modernization can occur under the banners of different syncretist nationalisms in which religion continues to play a large role. Even among latecomers to nationalism, strategy and choice matter more to outcomes than structure does, and they reflect the different pressures of ideology, adaptation (the choice of new means), and, occasionally, social learning (the choice of new ends). Yet only four of the eight countries-Brazil, China, Mexico, and Russia (until 1991)-have experienced successful rationalization.
Haas concluded that only social learning leads to lasting societal integration and that this outcome is due to the self-examination that it permits. So here, too, liberal nationalism is found to be the most progressive type of nationalism. It alone is open to continuous compromise between changing perceptions of interest and values, on the one hand, and newly acquired knowledge, on the other. It should be noted that for Haas the triumph of liberalism is procedural rather than substantive. He rejected fixed liberal dogmas in favor of liberal rules that remain devoid of moral content and that permit vigorous debate and conflict among competing interests and values, none of which can claim inherent superiority. Diffuse reciprocity and compromise, not moral ends, are at the core of his procedural understanding of liberal, progressive nationalism.
Haas' theory of nationalism is distinctive and yet deeply influenced by the work of Karl Deutsch, a fact freely acknowledged in the preface of the first volume, where he wrote that Deutsch's work persuaded him "at the very beginning of my academic life that history can be formally analyzed, not merely told as stories" (Haas 1997, p. ix) . For both Deutsch and Haas, modernization and social mobilization are crucial forces driving the spread of nationalism. And these processes are amenable to quantitative estimates: in Haas' case to measurements of the degree of consensual rationalization, and in Deutsch's to measurements of the balance between the nationally assimilated and unassimilated shares of the population. Haas saw and hoped for an open-ended process in which liberal nationalism would eventually prevail and then transform itself into variants of multilateral cosmopolitanism; Deutsch, in contrast, predicted a century or more of fragmenting empires and polities, accompanied only in a few instances by the emergence of pluralistic security communities. Still, there exists a remarkable similarity in their overall assessment of the future of nationalism and in the empirical methods they used for coming to a reasoned assessment of trend lines that connect the past to the future. Moreover, their scholarship stands up extremely well in comparison to the best classical work of scholars like Kohn, who preceded them during the interwar years, and to the most recent scholarship on the subject, such as Anderson's. Haas and Deutsch were frequently on opposite sides of arguments about the future of regional integration. But on the question of nationalism they shared intellectual orientations and were politically committed to a somewhat technocratic, progressive notion of achieving social change. This is not to argue that Haas was propounding the message of modernization theory 1960s-or 1990s-style. No End of History here. The data in Volume 2 suggest that the continued salience of religion is the main reason why modernization does not automatically yield a progressive liberal nationalism. Significant rationalization can be achieved through nonliberal forms of nationalism that mobilize religion in support of governance. Indeed, integral-not liberal-nationalism is the most effective modernizer, although sustainable progress thereafter is best served by liberal nationalism.
Volume 2 thus links directly to a line of reasoning developed in the 1990s by Eisenstadt and historians working under the label of "multiple modernities." Like Haas, these scholars think in long time periods and put religion at a central place. Modern societies are not converging around common patterns of capitalist industrialization, political democratization, and secularism. Rather, "the idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world. . .is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs" (Eisenstadt 2000, p. 2) . Different civilizational or religious cores continuously reinfuse culturally different programs in creating the antinomies of modernity. Modernizing non-Western societies and modern Western societies thus display different patterns of modernity. The cultural core of West European modernity offers a specific "bundle of moral-cognitive imperatives under the premises of the rationalization of the world" (Spohn 2001, p. 501) , and a secularizing reconstruction of religious traditions that radiates outward to other parts of Europe as well as North and South America through imposition, emulation, and incorporation.
Because Western modernity is adopted selectively and transformed in widely differing political and cultural contexts, however, it does not create a common global standard. Indeed, Western modernity is sufficiently broad to allow for tensions, even contradictions, between orthodox and heterodox orientations and identities, and ineluctable conflicts between geographic and socioeconomic centers and peripheries. Even among advanced industrial societies, such as Germany and Japan, the ability of modernity to accommodate the vast differences in religious traditions confirms its political plasticity and institutional plurality (Eisenstadt 1986 (Eisenstadt , 1996 (Eisenstadt , 1998 ). Yet Haas and Eisenstadt did part company on the crucial case of Japan. For Haas, Japan ends up in the liberal nationalist camp, whereas Eisenstadt would code it as a case of syncretist nationalism. That disagreement cuts to a question at the very core of Haas' enterprise: Does liberal nationalism win out in his formulation simply because of his prior, strong ontological commitment to open-ended learning that, by the author's fiat, only liberal (not syncretist) nationalism can embody? Going well beyond the Japanese case, the answer to this question is of fundamental importance to the political evolution of nationalism in this century. While Eisenstadt's work is rooted in Weber on world religions, Haas' draws from Weber on bureaucratic rationality. And whereas Eisenstadt is willing to accept antinomies that are perpetually recreated and that make even traditional fundamentalism modern, Haas held with determination to the idea that in the long term the self-reflexivity, open-endedness, and procedural thinness of liberal nationalism give it a decisive edge over all other forms of nationalism.
Finally, at least on the surface, there is nothing that connects Haas' work to the recent and highly innovative combinations of rational choice and anthropology, and of computer simulation based on agent-based modeling, which have begun to make important inroads in the analysis of national identity. Because of his profound interest in social learning and knowledge rather than mere interest and information, Haas kept his distance from strong-he might even have said "dogmatic"-versions of rational choice. But surface appearances can be somewhat misleading. The boost that complexity theory is getting from the microelectronic revolution might have tempted Haas were he to start his academic career now. For him, words always were imperfect instruments for catching deeper theoretical insights. He will advance that cause. We have sought to contribute to it by summarizing Haas' voluminous and sometimes difficult work, making it more readily accessible and clarifying why he took the analytical positions he did.
Haas' special contribution was to push us beyond the limits of the mundane, observable, contemporary realities of world politics, including "certain Hobbesian aspects." He presented us with enduring questions about, and brilliant insights into, the relationships among the universal desire for human betterment, the unintended consequences of self-interested behavior on the part of states and other actors, and social learning and transformations in the practices and institutions of world politics. Those who believe in the possibility of progress in the relations among states without succumbing to illusions about its immanence-or imminence-are permanently in his debt.
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